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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes whether there is a positive correlation between the levels

of government-directed violence and oil wealth, against the backdrop of the Arab
Spring. Have governments of the Middle East and North African (MENA)
states that

possess more oil wealth used more violence on their protesti
ng citizens than
governments of states that have little or no oil wealth? Does the so-calle
d “resource

curse” apply to the outcomes of the Arab Spring? This thesis attempted to answer
these questions by (1) studying the levels of government-directed violence in the
Arab
Spring uprisings and (2) examining the oil wealth and oil
reliance of six MENA

states: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. F indings show that higher

levels of oil wealth corresponded to higher levels of government-directed violence in
MENA states are not monarchies, because with the exception of Bahrain, the other 5
states did show a

positive correlation between the levels of oil wealth and

government-directed violence. Further research on this topic showed that other
monarchies in the MENA

also had behavior similar to Bahrain, thus the thesis

concludes that the “resource-curse” hypothesis does hold true under certain
conditions.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2010, Mohammed

Bouazizi, a 26 year old Tunisian fruit

vendor, set himself on fire after being ignored and humiliated by Tunisian authorities
when he complained that his cart was confiscated by the police and that he was
brutally attacked by the Tunisian police for selling products without a permit. On
January 4, 20011, Bouazizi died of his wounds.

Although this incident appeared as a personal tragedy at first, Mohammed
Bouazizi’s self- immolation sparked the so called “Arab Spring,” the ongoing series
of revolutionary and political upheavals challenging the established government
authorities throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)'. Tunisians had
endured the authoritarian rule of the Tunisian President, Zine-el-Abidinde Ben Ali for
so long, and the situation reached its boiling point after Bouazizi’s death. Thousands
of Tunisians took to the streets to demonstrate against the Ben Ali regime, and people
across the MENA followed the footsteps of the Tunisians protesting against their
respective regimes. So far, these protests have resulted in toppling of the thirty-yearold regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, major civil uprisings in Syria and Yemen, and a
civil war in Libya that eventually led to the death of the Libyan leader, Muammar
Gaddafi.

‘According to the World Bank definition, MENA region includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza and Yemen
(http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0.,menuPK:247619~pag
ePK:146748~piPK:146812~theSitePK:256299,00.html)
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While these popular protests, revolutions and uprisings brought about change to
the political systems of many states across the MENA, this change came at the cost of

many civilian lives due to government-directed violence in response to Arab-Spring
uprisings. By the end of 2011, the death toll in Libya had reached 30,000.” According
to the United Nations, over 5,000 people had died in Syria by the end of 2011.° As of
the first quarter of year 2012, the death toll in Syria is increasing due to the alleged
“democide,” the killing of people by their own government, which is being carried out
by the government of Syria, under President Bashar al-Assad.’ While there are
considerably high death tolls in states like Libya, Syria and Yemen, states like

Bahrain and Tunisia had seen relatively low numbers of casualties as a result of the
Arab Spring.°
From its onset to the present, the Arab Spring has become a phenomenon that has
captured global attention. It is unlikely that both the people and the leaders in the
MENA and the rest of the world anticipated the termination of decade long tenures of
Tunisia’s Ben Ali or Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak; or an end to Gaddafi’s rule. This is
because the governments across the MENA were infamously known for their robust
authoritarianism and resistance to democratization. For example, MENA states failed
to catch the third wave of democratization that took place between 1974 and 1990
where many Latin American and Eastern European states transitioned into

? Source: Amnesty International

3 Source: United Nations
* "Syrian authorities 'committed crimes' against civilians." BBC, 3 Mar 2012. Web. (accessed 13
March, 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17242412>.
> By the end of 2011, Amnesty International reported that there have been 47 deaths in Bahrain, and
308. (Source: Amnesty International). The Yemeni government had reported to the UN in March, 2012
that 2,000 people had died in Yemen in 2011 due to the Arab-Spring uprisings.
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democracies.°

In fact, as Bellin notes, the number of electoral democracies in the

MENA has actually registered an absolute decline since 1972 while the number in the
rest of the world has nearly doubled.’ Therefore, the signs of a potential emergence of
democracy and the political transformation the MENA region is experiencing at the
moment have generated conversations even about a possible “fourth wave of
democracy” among scholars and analysts who attempt to interpret the future of the
MENA region after the Arab Spring.®
When observing the events of the Arab Spring, especially how governments
responded to the popular protests, it is apparent that the Arab Spring uprisings came
as a surprise to the leaders of the MENA states. For many years MENA states have
been distinguished by their absence of political inclusivity.’ But now, we are able to
witness the initial reactions and responses to the Arab Spring uprisings by these
leaders due to the unforeseen nature of this political upheaval that spread across the
region. While some state leaders attempted to calm down the demonstrators and the
protesting crowds with non-violent measures, some leaders responded to the Arab
Spring protests in their states with excessive violence. For example, while the Yemeni
President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to calm down the thousands of protesters in
the Yemini capital Sana’a in early February of 2011 by promising not to seek
reelection in 2013, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi deployed mercenaries and armed

® Huntington, Samuel P. Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series. Vol. 4, The Third Wave.,
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. eBook Collection
(EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost (accessed March 3, 2012).

7 Bellin, E. (January 2004), The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in
Comparative Perspective. Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2,139.
’Diamond, Larry. “A Fourth Wave or False Start?” Foreign Policy 22 May, 2011 (accessed 3 March,
2012) http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/67862/larry-diamond/a-fourth-wave-or-false-start
° Diamond, Larry 'Why Are There No Arab Democracies?', Journal of Democracy, (2010), 21 (1).
3

prisoners to clear the streets of Libyan people protesting against the Gaddafi regime.'
The Syrian President Bashar al-Assad also has been accused of using excessive force
against Syrians.
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Figure 1.1: Middle East and North Africa (Source: UNICEF)

What interested me to write my thesis on the Arab Spring is the variation in the
levels of government-directed violence in response to popular protests and uprisings
related to the Arab Spring. Although authoritarianism is common in all MENA
governments, it is interesting to observe that the level of government-directed
violence varies from state to state. Therefore, in order to come up with an explanation
for this variation in government-directed violence, I decided to look for other

'° Timeline Arab Spring, Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP)
(http://www.pcr.uu.se/digital Assets/87/87711_chronologic_timeline_arabian_spring.pdf)
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characteristics that states in MENA would have in common, but also in different
levels: oil wealth.!!

The MENA region constitutes vast oil reserves compared to the rest of the world.
According to the 2010 Annual Statistical Report by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 58.5% of world’s proven crude oil reserves are in the
MENA region.” Therefore, the economies of these MENA states rely heavily on the
windfalls of oil revenue that they make from the petroleum industry.
A large body of scholarly literature, popularly known as “resource-curse”
literature, suggests an inverse relationship between this resource wealth and
development. While most of the “resource-curse” literature explains the adverse
economic outcomes due to natural resource endowments, some literature argues about

adverse political outcomes due to oil wealth in addition to unfavorable economic
outcomes. As I take into account this “oil impedes democracy” argument of the
resource-curse hypothesis for my research, my decision to particularly use oil wealth
as the independent variable to explain different levels of government-directed
violence in response to the Arab Spring uprisings is not a coincidence. While some
scholars like Michael Ross, Kai Kaiser, and Nimah Mazaheri are using the resource-

curse hypothesis to assess the future of the political stability in the MENA region
following the Arab Spring, I particularly look at mechanisms of how government

"' Other factors these states have in common are their colonial history and Islam. All the states in my

sample of cases have been colonized by a European state at one point in their history. Although Islam
is also a shared characteristic in all MENA states (with the exception of Israel), the difference within
the levels of Islamic population in each state is extremely low as all states have significantly high

presence of Islam. Therefore, in my research both colonial history and Islam are considered constants.
'2Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011”, OPEC (accessed 10 March, 2012)
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2010_2011.pdf
5

leaders of MENA

states might have used oil revenues to fund violent activities against

the citizens of their states in response to Arab-Spring uprisings.'°
In this thesis I investigate whether there is a positive correlation between the
levels of government-directed violence and oil wealth, against the backdrop of the

Arab Spring. Have governments of MENA states that possess more oil wealth used
more violence on their protesting citizens than governments of states that have little or
no oil wealth? Does the so-called “resource curse” apply to the outcomes of the Arab
Spring? I attempt to answer these questions by (1) studying the levels of governmentdirected violence in the Arab Spring uprisings and (2) examining the oil wealth and
oil reliance of six MENA states: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.

Although all these states are known for their reliance on oil wealth, it is important to
note that the levels of oil wealth in each state still vary, just as the levels of

government-directed violence in response to the Arab Spring uprisings vary from
state to state despite the authoritarian nature of all six states. Based on this
information, I suspect that there is a robust positive correlation between the levels of
government-directed violence and oil wealth.

In Chapter Two of my thesis, I explore existing scholarly literature on the
resource-curse hypothesis. To generate my hypothesis about different levels of oil

wealth and government-directed violence in the Arab Spring uprisings, I draw on
major works that explain various relationships between oil wealth, democracy, and
economic development within and beyond the MENA region. Although my

assumptions in this thesis are primarily based on the political aspect of the resource-

'? In July 2011, Michael Ross, Kai Kaiser and Nimah Mazaheri produced a policy research working
paper for the World Bank titled “The ‘Resource Curse’ in MENA?: Political Transitions, Resource
Wealth, Economic Stability and Conflict Risk.”

curse hypothesis, it is important to explore the literature on the economic aspect of the
hypothesis as well, because it helps us better understand the origins of resource curse.
Therefore, in this chapter, I will first explore resource-curse literature related to

economic outcomes and then literature related to political outcomes. While there are
both proponents and opponents of the resource-curse hypothesis, I argue that the
resource-curse hypothesis might help explain the government-directed violence in the
Arab Spring. At the end of Chapter Two, I apply the theory and present the hypothesis
which I derived from the events of the Arab Spring and previous scholarship on oil
wealth and democracy.
Chapter Three is the Research Design, and in Chapter Four I present the
analysis of my thesis, where I analyze and assess the levels of oil wealth and
government-directed violence of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. In
this chapter I will provide the empirical evidence I gathered from my research. In the
first third of this Chapter, I provide a more detailed overview of the Arab Spring
while giving particular attention to the six states mentioned above. Since the Arab
Spring is still ongoing in some MENA states like Syria and Yemen (unlike in Egypt

and Tunisia where regime changes occurred), the empirical data on governmentdirected violence in response to the Arab Spring uprisings that I use for my research

will be taken from events that unfolded only up to January 31, 2012. The second third
of the chapter presents data and other information related to oil wealth and
government-directed violence in each of the six states. Based on the salient qualitative
and quantitative evidence provided in the previous chapters, the final third of Chapter

Four will cover a final assessment and a discussion. Finally, in Chapter Five, I present
my conclusions and propose possible outcomes for the future of the Arab Spring in
the MENA region.

It is the devil’s excrement. We are drowning in the devil's excrement.
—Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, Founder of OPEC’

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to better understand the theoretical background for my research
question which asks whether there was more government-directed violence in
response to Arab-Spring uprisings in states that have more oil wealth, this chapter will
explore existing scholarly literature on the resource-curse hypothesis. The term
“resource curse” first appeared in 1993 in Richard M. Auty’s book “Sustaining

Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis.” Although the term
“resource curse” was coined recently, the Greek myth about “King Midas and His
Golden Touch” is a good example of the fact that the notion that natural resources
tend to bring more misfortune than benefits, goes back to ancient times.'* Also known
as the “paradox of plenty,” the resource-curse hypothesis suggests that states with an
abundance of natural resources tend to experience adverse economic and political
outcomes. The adverse economic outcomes that correlate with higher levels of natural
resources include slow or negative rates economic growth, and adverse political

'4 Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso was Venezuela’s oil minister in the early 1960s and was one of the
founders of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). He is considered as one of the

first people in recent history to call attention to the resource curse, specifically with regard to oil.
'S King Midas was granted one wish by the god Dionysus and his wish was to have everything he
touched turn to gold. After this wish was granted, everything he touched turned to gold. Eventually, he
was unable to eat or drink anything for everything turned gold at his touch. In the end, King Midas had
to ask Dionysus to take back his golden touch because this gift had turned into curse. The god took pity
on him and took away the golden touch.
(http://www. hipark.austin.isd.tenet.edu/mythology/midas.html)

outcomes due to the resource curse include outbreaks of civil war and high levels of
authoritarianism.
Literature on the notion that there is a correlation between natural resources and
adverse economic outcomes is often linked with parallel literature that suggests a
correlation between natural resources and authoritarianism. Taken together, there is a
voluminous body of resource-curse literature in which scholars have both supported
or rejected this idea that resource-rich states are cursed by what seems like a blessing
to common intuition. The paradox of why resource-rich states have not developed in
the ways that we would normally expect a wealthy state to be developed has led to
extensive research as well as a rise in public interest on the resource-curse, so the
literature available on this topic is substantial. It ranges from political-economy
literature to policy reports produced by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
even articles on the mass media such as Thomas Friedman’s 2006 article on Foreign
Policy, “The First Law of Petropolitics” in which he posits that the price of oil and the
pace of freedom always move in the opposite directions in oil-rich states.'° Although
my assumptions in this thesis are primarily based on the political aspect of the
resource-curse hypothesis, it is important to explore the literature on the economic
aspect of the theory as well, because it helps us better understand the origins of
resource curse. This chapter will, therefore, present scholarly literature on research of
the resource-curse phenomena done by both economists and political scientists.

‘Friedman, Thomas. (2006). The First Law of Petropolitics. Foreign Policy, 154, p.28

The Resource Curse and Economic Development
There has been a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical works that
provide support for the resource-curse hypothesis from an economic perspective.
Works by Auty (1994), Gylfason (2001, 2001a, 2001b), Rodriguez and Sachs (1999),
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b) have all provided strong support to the
idea that natural resource wealth is likely to hinder economic growth rather than
promote it. Providing an empirical justification for this hypothesis, Sachs and Warner
(1995) presented the first extensive statistical analysis which stimulated further
research on the resource-curse hypothesis.'” Using this analysis, they were able to
show that during the twenty-year period between 1970 and 1990, economies with a
high ratio of natural resource export to GDP in 1970 (i.e. the base year) tended to
grow slowly over time, even after controlling for many variables that were found to
be vital for economic growth.'®
Over the past four decades, numerous scholars have conducted research in order
to explicate the mechanisms of the resource-curse hypothesis. According to Corden
(1984), states that are resource-rich and therefore resource-reliant tend to suffer from

currency overvaluations and loss of competitiveness, because of the overabundance of
natural resources. This idea is closely in association with the Dutch Disease.'”

” Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M., 1995. Natural resource abundance and economic growth, NBER Working

Paper No 5398. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA
18 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,”

(Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development: 1997) p. 1
'° The “Dutch disease” refers to revenues from a newly-discovered natural resource creating a demand
shock that triggers inflationary pressures and results in an overvaluation of the local currency. The term

“Dutch disease” originated from a crisis in the Netherlands in the late 1950s after the discovery of vast
deposits of natural gas in the North Sea. This newfound oil wealth caused the Dutch guilder to rise,
causing exports of all non-oil products to become less competitive in the world market. Therefore, the
“Dutch disease” too could be considered as another mechanism of the resource-curse.
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Another mechanism would be the increase in corruption and rent-seeking as shown by
Krueger (1974) and Torvik (2002), because natural resources may tempt individuals,
especially government leaders, to engage in rent-seeking competitions rather than
using the wealth for the development of the state. With regards to the same idea,
Papyrakis talks about the mismanagement of resource rents to relieve internal
pressure from domestic interest groups in oil-rich states. He presents a theoretical
mechanism explaining the tendency of resource income to decrease incentives to save
and invest; he says that “resource-rich countries tend to neglect the necessity to save
and direct their resource windfalls into productive investment.’”° He finds ample
evidence of policy failures across developing states linked to underinvestment of
natural-resource revenues. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) have noticed low capital
investment in resource-rich states while Gylfason (2001a) provides evidence of low
levels of educational quality, which is an important factor in the development of a
state. Bad decision making (Sachs and Warner 1999b, Auty 2001) and political
instability (Collier and Hoefler, 1998) are also two of the mechanisms of the
economic version of the resource-curse hypothesis.
Speaking of significant injections of oil revenues made from oil-extractive
industries of oil-rich states, Gylfason (2001b) notes that over the past five decades this

wealth that was injected into their local economies has not prevented them from
experiencing negative rates of income growth. Diaz-Alejandro (1970) points out this
phenomenon with the example of Argentina, which ranked among the ten wealthiest
states at the beginning of last century, but failed to prevent its continuous downgrade

© Papyrakis, Elissaios. “The Political Economy of King Midas: Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth”. 2006. p.36 (http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/9834/1/7480.pdf)
11

to a developing state despite its vast resource base. In comparison to other developed
states during the first part of the 20" century, Argentina’s economy was relatively
quite strong, but it started to decline in the 1950s. The same happened to Venezuela
after its first oil boom. Before, it had the second highest GDP per capita in Latin
America, but it sustained an average income growth rate of -3% after the boom.

According to Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004b), the same applies to Alaska, because
despite its vast oil reserves and its fishing industry, it is the only state in the United
States with negative growth over the last three decades.
Early development economists such as Nurkse (1953) and Watkins (1963)
dispute the idea of a resource curse by saying that natural-resource endowments could
improve living standards by economic expansions. Therefore, one should recognize
that despite much empirical evidence and theoretical work that provides strong
support to the resource-curse hypothesis, there is also a genre of literature that
challenges the assumptions made in support of the resource curse. Papyrakis,
therefore, says that the resource-curse hypothesis is by no means an economic law
without exceptions.”!
Many opponents of the resource-curse hypothesis draw examples from history
to dispute the thesis. For example, Wright (1990) argues that the discoveries of the
minerals supported the rapid industrial expansion and technological transformation in
the United States to a large extent at the beginning of the twentieth century. Sachs and
Warner (1999a), for instance, argue that Ecuador benefited from its oil boom between

1972 and 1986, and the same authors (1995) point out that the industrial revolutions

?1Papyrakis, Elissaios. “The Political Economy of King Midas: Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth”, 2006. p.2 (http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/9834/1/7480.pdf)
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in Great Britain and Germany were supported by extensive deposits of coal and iron
ore. A more recent example would be the case of Norway, the second largest oil
exporter in the world. Gylfason and Zoega (2001) say that Norway shows no
symptoms of stagnation as proponents of the resource-curse hypothesis might expect,
because Norway manages to convert its resource wealth into economic prosperity.
Given these various scholarly literature in which we find both strong support
as well as convincing disputes of the resource-curse hypothesis, we could agree with
Wright (1990) who posits that “there is no iron law associating natural resource
abundance with national industry strength.”

Resource Curse, Democracy, and Authoritarianism

The notion that economic and fiscal reliance on natural resources like petroleum,
natural gas and minerals tends to create and perpetuate authoritarian and
undemocratic political regimes is the basis of the resource-curse hypothesis from a
political-economy viewpoint. There is a substantial literature that supports this
hypothesis, and the genesis of the resource-curse hypothesis from this aspect can be
found in the works of Mahdavy (1970). Mahdavy notes that petroleum revenues in
Middle Eastern states amount to an external source of rents that is directly captured by
the governments, thus rendering them unaccountable to the citizens of those states,

because these oil-revenues “enable the governments to embark on large public
expenditure programs without resorting to taxation.” This idea paved way for other
scholars to start building upon Mahdavy to offer general laws about authoritarianism
and rents obtained from natural resources.
Building upon Mahdavy, several scholars including Luciani (1987) have reiterated
the proposition that oil-rich governments need not resort to taxation, which ultimately
13

leads to authoritarian or undemocratic political regimes. Luciani notes that when there
is no taxation, there is no representation. Explaining the mechanism for this,
Huntington says, “oil revenues accrue to the state: they therefore increase the power
of the state bureaucracy and, because they reduce or eliminate the need for taxation,

they also reduce the need for the government to solicit the acquiescence of the public
to taxation. The lower the level of taxation, the less the reasons there are for the public
to demand representation.”** Ross views this as autocrats buying off citizens, because
“when rulers want to raise taxes, citizens demand accountability,” and by providing
them with many benefits with virtually no taxation, citizens cannot demand
accountability.”
Speaking specifically on Africa, Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) note that many
resource dependent states in Africa experienced a backslide toward authoritarian rule
and struggled with democratic consolidation even after the so called “third wave” of
democratization. These resource-dependent states include Algeria, Nigeria, Libya,
Gabon, Cameron and the former Zaire. Although there is evidence that suggest that

discoveries of natural resources and resource abundance in general have led to a
decrease in the economic growth rates in oil-rich states in Africa, Jensen and
Wantchekon say that the relationship between authoritarianism and natural resources
is less studied. After comparing the above resource-dependent states with other
African states, they find that with the exception of South Africa, the transition to
democracy has been successful only in resource-poor states such as Benin, Mali,

2 Huntington, “The Third Wave of Democracy.” p.95
33 Ross, Michael L. “Will oil drown the Arab spring?: Democracy and the Resource Curse”
September/October 2011 p.6
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Senegal and Madagascar.” They also find that resource-dependent economies were
more likely to be authoritarian, associated with worse governance, are more likely to
exhibit higher levels of government spending, and were more likely to lead to
breakdown in democracy following the third wave of democratic transitions in the last
decade of the twentieth century. Their findings on the negative correlation between
the level of resource dependence and the level of democracy corroborate a finding by
Bratton (1998) that there was a decline in the level of democracy in several African
states in the post-third wave democratization period between 1995 and 1997. Bratton
finds that there was a decline in the rate of leadership alternation (from 37% to 6.6%)
between the founding elections that took place from 1989 to 1994 and the second
elections that took place from 1995 to 1997. Building on Bratton’s finding, Jensen
and Wantchekon suggest that this result could be attributed partly to natural-resource
dependence of these African states.
Explaining some of the other mechanism of natural resources causing to fuel
undemocratic politics, Ayittey (1998) posits that high levels of resource rents and
executive discretion in the distribution of these rents allow incumbents to simply use
the rents to buy off the opposition. This mechanism is clear in most sub-Saharan
African states because their weak political institutions easily let incumbent politicians
to use this resource wealth for political gain, as Ayittey has observed in Nigeria and
Niger. Ross also explains a similar mechanism by noting that autocrats use the
revenues gained from national oil industries to lavishly fund—and buy off the loyalty

*4 Jsensen, Nathan, and Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. “Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in
Africa.” Comparative Political Studies 37: p.816
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of—the armed forces of their states.”> He says, “Iranian President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, for example, has given billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to
business associated with the elite paramilitary Revolutionary Guards.”
In his seminal article titled “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” in World Politics,
Ross (2001) concludes that a state’s reliance on either oil or mineral exports tends to
make the state less democratic.”° In his article Ross provides three causal explanations
for his argument: rentier effect, repression effect, and modernization effect. A rentier
effect is produced through a mechanism in which governments use low tax rates and
high spending to dampen pressures for democracy. Oil revenues allow government
leaders to spend more on patronage and impose very low domestic taxes so that it
helps reduce demands for government accountability to citizens. In addition,
governments sponsor associations with oil revenues to drive out independent civil
associations. A repression effect is formed when oil wealth enables governments to
spend more on security and repression forces to build up their internal security.””

Finally, a modernization effect is produced when the dependence on commodity
exports retards social and cultural changes that are necessary for democracy, because
Ross says that the population’s failure to move into industrial and service sector jobs
renders them less likely to push for democracy. Using a statistical analysis from 113
states between 1971 and 1997, Ross (2001) he makes the above conclusion that oil

does hinder democracy. He also concludes that this effect is not caused by other types

25 Ross, Michael. "Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the Resource Curse." Foreign
Affairs Sept. 2011: p.2

26 Ross, Michael. (April 2001) "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics (53:3): p.351
27 Ross also says that extra security might be needed to quell ethnic conflict, since mineral wealth is

often geographically concentrated but benefits are diffused.
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of primary exports and that it is not limited to the Arabian Peninsula, to the Middle
East, or sub-Saharan Africa nor is it limited to small states.

With regard to a rentier effect, Ross finds that higher personal and corporate taxes
are strongly associated with more democratic governments and that the larger the
government is, the less movement toward democracy over the following years. With
regard to a repression effect, Ross finds that oil wealth may be linked to higher levels
of military spending, which in turn tends to impede democracy. However, he does not
find evidence of a similar pattern for mineral wealth nor he finds no evidence to
support the claim that oil or mineral wealth leads to higher levels of military
personnel. As for the modernization effect, he finds that states with greater naturalresource wealth tend to grow slower than resource-poor counterparts, that states with
natural-resource wealth have more civil wars, that states with oil and mineral wealth

are less democratic and that this relationship is present not just in the Middle East, but
also in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Although Ross (2001) was not the first author to suggest that oil hinders
democracy, it touched off a debate over the relationship between resource wealth and
regime types. While some studies supported Ross’s central finding that oil inhibits
democratization (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Epstein et al. 2006; Ulfelder 2007;

Gassebner, Lamala and Vreeland 2008), there are dissenters like Herb (2005) who
argues that oil’s impact on government accountability has been exaggerated and that it
does not stand up to alternative statistical tests (Haber and Menaldo 2007; Acemoglu

et al. 2008; Horiuchi and Wagle 2008).8 Herb (2005) and Dunning (2008) argue that

28 Ross, Michael. “Oil and Democracy Revisited.”
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oil%20and%20Democracy%20Revisited.pdf

[Preliminary Draft]
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oil has both positive and negative effects on the likelihood of democratic transitions,
which made its net impact ambiguous and thereby questioning the validity of the
central finding of Ross (2001). Therefore, in 2009 Ross revisits the analysis in his
earlier work and offers several improvements that include better measures of the key
variables and a wider data set. He explains that despite flaws in the previous analysis
and many challenges from other scholars, he still finds strong evidence that oil wealth
tends to prolong authoritarian rule. However, he also finds that there are intriguing
anomalies such as the undemocratic effects on oil seem to have grown over time and
to have no impact in Latin America. In addition, Ross no longer finds support for
repression effect or the modernization effect in his improved analysis. But he finds
that rentier effect still applies and that it is also consistent with public opinion data.
Finally, Ross admits that although it is possible to explain how oil income impedes
democracy, it is harder to explain why it impedes democracy.”
Bringing in different perspectives to the resource-curse hypothesis, Papyrakis and
Gerlagh (2004d) propose that “natural wealth may enhance idleness, bureaucracy and
discourage people from innovation and efficiency improvements,” which eventually
leads to policy failures. In his book “The Political Economy of King Midas”
Papyrakis calls this process “easy riches leading to sloth.” *° He says that this might
be because resource wealth leads people to believe that they have a larger margin of
error when planning ahead.

°Ross. “Oil and Democracy Revisited.” P.25
3° Papyrakis, Elissaios. “The Political Economy of King Midas: Resource Abundance and Economic
Growth”. 2006. p.13 (http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/9834/1/7480.pdf)
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Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004) provide another finding related to the
resource-curse hypothesis by suggesting that the onset of civil war is more likely in
states that are more dependent on natural-resource exports. In investigating whether
civil wars have economic causes, they found that the amount of natural resources ina

state was both a significant and strong determinant of the duration and the probability
of civil wars.?!
While many scholars have provided support for the existence of a resource
curse, some scholars have come up with arguments against the resource-curse
hypothesis and have provided evidence that dispute the negative correlation between
the level of natural resources and economic growth. Herb (2005) disagrees with the
hypothesis by reasoning that “resource-reliant states would have been substantially
poorer had they not found oil, gas, or minerals, and that their lower GDPs would have

caused them to be even less democratic.” Smith (2004) finds that oil wealth is
robustly associated with increased regime durability, even when controlling for
repression. Using cross-sectional time series data from 107 developing states between
1960 and 1999, he tests the effects of oil wealth on regime failure, political protests,
and civil war. He also finds that higher levels of oil wealth are associated with lower
likelihoods of civil war and antistate protests.
Haber and Menaldo (2011) address a number of problems that proponents of
the resource-curse hypothesis have failed to understand. They point out that extant
cross-country regressions are not an effective strategy for uncovering causal
relationships, because natural-resource reliance is not an exogenous variable. They

3! Other determinants of the duration and the probability of civil wars were, initial income, ethno-

linguistic fractionalism, and initial population size.
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also say that numerous sources of bias maybe driving the results, the most serious of

which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country-specific and timeinvariant heterogeneity. To address these problems, they develop unique historical
datasets, employ time-series centric techniques, and operationalize explicitly specified
counterfactuals. Their results indicate that oil and mineral wealth reliance does not
promote dictatorship over the long run. If anything, Haber and Menaldo say that the
opposite is true, and that in many specifications they generate results that suggest a
resource blessing.
In addition to findings supporting or disputing the resource-curse hypothesis,
there is also scholarly research that suggests the non-existence of a resource-curse
hypothesis or the conditional nature of the hypothesis in a political aspect.
Challenging the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Elbadawi and Sambanis
(2002) find no significant effect of natural-resource dependence on civil war
prevalence. Speaking about the same topic, de Soysa (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003)
and Humphreys (2003) all suggest that various types of natural resources may differ

in their effects on civil war onset and duration.
Morrison (2009) not only finds that oil revenues may not be particularly
unique, but also claims that all nontax revenues which include oil revenues in fact
lead to regime stability. He argues that an increase in nontax revenues should be
associated with less taxation of elites in democracies, more social spending in
dictatorships and therefore more stability for both regime types. Morrison shows that
the particular source of nontax revenue does not make a difference and that they all
act similarly with regard to regime stability and the causal mechanisms. According to
him, these nontax revenues not only include natural-resource revenues obtained

through state-owned enterprises and foreign aid, but also borrowings from abroad or
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the Central Bank and all other revenues besides taxation.’” He says that if oil revenues
are more significant compared to other non-tax revenues it would be so only if oil
revenues make up a large percentage of such externally obtained revenues.

Suggesting the need for conditional theories for the resource-curse hypothesis,
Dunning (2008) argues that different states have varied paths from resource wealth to
political and economic outcomes. He looks at three cases, post-independence
Botswana, Mobutu’s Zaire, and Suharto’s Indonesia and argues that three variables—

the world market structure for the resource, the degree of societal opposition to elites,
and the prior development of the non-resource private sector—influenced elites’
incentives for diversification and thereby shaped outcomes along the dimensions of
political stability and economic performance of these three states.

Concluding Remarks and the Hypothesis
In the context of explaining the different levels of government-directed
violence by different MENA states in response to the Arab-Spring uprisings using the
resource-curse hypothesis, the works of Ross and other scholars provide the most
compelling findings that support the above hypothesis. Their findings of a positive
correlation between levels of natural resources that states own and adverse political
outcomes such as authoritarianism, higher levels of repression, and civil conflict are
of particular relevance to the research question I ask in my thesis; i.e. did states with
more oil use more violence against their people in response to Arab-Spring uprisings?
Especially, Ross’s argument that oil wealth provides greater resources for tools of

Morrison, Kevin M. 2009. “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime
Stability.” /nternational Organization 63, Winter 2009, p.114
21

repression—as he finds that oil wealth may be linked to higher levels of military
spending, which in turn tends to impede democracy—provides the basic foundation
and the mechanism for my own argument that more oil lead to more government-

directed violence in the Arab Spring.
After examining the events that unfolded in the Arab Spring and exploring

previous scholarly literature on the resource-curse hypothesis, I have derived the
following hypothesis: there is a positive correlation between the level of oil wealth of

each state and the level of government-directed violence in response to Arab-Spring
uprisings in the respective states. In other words, the greater the level of oil wealth of

a MENA state is, the greater the level of government-directed violence. The fact that
most MENA governments have the ability to transform oil wealth into large revenues
which they can use to control their citizens as well as to fund their militaries make my
argument that “more oil, more government-directed violence” a plausible argument. |
do not claim that government-directed violence in response to Arab-Spring uprisings
solely depends on oil wealth, but I will demonstrate that oil wealth does have a

noteworthy effect on government-directed violence.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN
We have already discussed that most MENA states are known for the robust
authoritarian nature of their governments. We have also discussed the considerable
amount of natural resource endowments these states possess compared to other parts
of the world. This thesis will examine both the extent to which the government
leaders of MENA states used violence against their people in response to Arab-Spring
uprisings and the level of oil wealth each government depends on, and then
investigate whether there is a positive correlation between the levels of governmentdirected violence and oil wealth of each MENA state. I study the events of the Arab
Spring in particular to investigate a possible relationship between governmentdirected violence and oil wealth, because the unforeseen and surprising nature of the
Arab-Spring uprisings provided us with the opportunity to witness firsthand the tools
of repression that MENA governments use against their people. In my opinion, these
unplanned and quick government responses best reveal the different levels of
authoritarianism in MENA states. That the Arab Spring is a shared phenomenon in the
MENA region is also another reason for me to conduct research against the backdrop
of the Arab Spring.
In order to answer my research question, whether there is a positive
correlation between the level of government-directed violence and oil wealth, I have
selected six MENA states that participated in the Arab Spring: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya,
Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Although there were Arab-Spring related demonstrations
and protests in other MENA states like Algeria, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
23

Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia, I selected the states that were above the 25-deaths-

per-calendar-year threshold by the end of year 2011. I made this selection according
to the definition ofa “campaign of one-sided violence” provided by the Human
Security Report Project (HSRP). In my research, a “campaign of one-sided violence”
corresponds with the government-directed violence in response to the Arab Spring
uprisings, and according to HSRP, a “campaign of one-sided violence is defined as
the use of armed force against civilians by the government of a state or a formally
organized group which results in 25 or more reported and codable deaths in a given
state in a calendar year.

These deaths, however, do not need to occur at the same

time as long as they occur in the given year. Thus, using this definition, I was able to
narrow down the sample of cases into Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and
Yemen.
As one could guess from the number of casualties of these states, it is in these
six states where there have been major political upheavals. The Arab Spring started in
Tunisia in the December of 2010, which eventually led to the collapse of the thirtyyear-old Ben-Ali regime. Tunisia’s events had a domino effect as popular protests and
demonstrations against governments started spreading into neighboring North African
states like Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco, and then to Middle-East states like
Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen. The Arab Spring so far has resulted in

regime change in Egypt and Tunisia, major civil uprisings in Bahrain, Syria and
Yemen, and a civil war in Libya. By the beginning of 2012, in addition to Tunisia’s
Ben-Ali’s fall, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Yemen’s Ali

3 Definitions, Human Security Research Project (http://www.hsrgroup.org/our-work/securitystats/Definitions.aspx) (Accessed: March13, 2012)
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Abdullah Saleh have also been thrown out from their thirty-year-old dictatorships. All
of these leaders with the exception of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi resigned
from their presidencies. Gaddafi, who refused to give into the demands of the Libyan
people and fought to the end was captured in his compound and was executed by
NATO -backed rebel forces on October 9, 2011. Syria’s al-Bashar, however, is still in

power as of the first quarter of 2012.

Measuring Government-Directed Violence

In my investigation, in order to analyze the level of government-directed
violence, I use the “number of deaths” of each state that has resulted in the ArabSpring uprisings as the dependent variable. I use the “number of deaths” in the Arab
Spring as a measurement of government-directed violence because death tolls provide
the best representation of the intensity of government-directed violence occurred in
each state.
While the “number of deaths” represent the dependent variable (i.e.
government-directed violence), I use “military expenditure” and “military personnel”
of each state as independent variables. I use these two variables to analyze the
different levels of government-directed violence in each state, because they not only
show the capacity of a government to use violence on its people, but also give us a
sense of how much oil wealth can been transferred into a tool of repression (i.e. the
military) that the government could use against its people. “Military expenditure” is a
appropriate variable to link oil wealth to government-directed violence in the Arab

Spring, because Ross (2001) finds that oil wealth may be linked to higher levels of
military spending, which in turn tends to make governments use more violence on
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their people.

Although he finds no evidence to support the claim that oil wealth (or

mineral wealth) leads to higher levels of military personnel®*, comparing the different
levels of military personnel across Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen
does provide a sense of the capacity of each government’s capacity to use violence
against its people.
For the “number of deaths” for Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia I obtained data
from Amnesty International. For Yemen, the number of deaths in 2011 was obtained
from a speech the Yemeni minister of human rights delivered at the United Nations.*°
While I obtained data for Syria from the United Nations (UN), I had to rely on the
figures provided by the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC) for the death
toll of Libya. As much as I would like to use data from the same source for
consistency, it was not possible to get death tolls for each country from just the UN or
Amnesty International. Therefore I had to use the death tolls from a combination of
the above internationally recognized non-governmental organizations. I decided to use
the figures provided by the NTC as legitimate data because the UN General Assembly
voted to award Libya’s seat in the UN to the NTC of Libya on September 16, 2011.”
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, many MENA states have been

undergoing major political transformations, and it is difficult for not only international

4 Ross, Michael. 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53: p.350
35 “Ross, Michael.“Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” p. 352

%6 «Yemeni Official Puts Uprising’s Toll at ‘Over 2,000 Martyrs’.” Laura Kasinof, The New York
Times. March 19, 2012. (http://Awww.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/yemeni-official-putskillings-at-more-than-2000.html) (Accessed March 21, 2012)

37 UN Press release :”After much wrangling, General Assembly seats National Transitional Council of
Libya as country’s representative for sixty-sixth session
(http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ga11137.doc.htm) (accessed: March 5, 2012)
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organizations but also MENA governments to keep track of accurate data in the
process of these changes. For these reasons I have come across certain problems with
the validity of data. One problem | had with using the “number of deaths” to measure
the different levels of government-directed violence was that the sources that
providing the data did not break down the death toll to specify how many on the
government side were killed and how many civilians were killed as a result of clashes
between the MENA governments and Arab-Spring protestors. Generally, the progovernment casualties include military personnel, policemen, and pro-government
activists. The casualties that resulted due to government-directed violence include
civilians, anti-government activists and sometimes, and defected military personnel.
Defected military personnel are the soldiers who joined the opposition by leaving the
government’s side, and this happened in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and also Syria. As
defected soldiers, civilians, the military, the police, and pro-government activists all

got involved in these Arab-Spring clashes, it is almost impossible at times to decode
the numbers when it comes to identifying who got killed fighting for which side.
Another problem that I encountered in obtaining accurate data was the large
discrepancies between data from government sources and international organizations.
For example, while the UN reported over 5,000 deaths in Syria by the end of 2011,
the Syrian President Assad al-Bashar dismissed the UN reports saying that most of the
Syrians killed during the Syrian uprising were in fact security forces and not civilians
as the UN had reported. Al-Bashar put the death toll of the Syrian security forces at
1,100 which meant that according to him, the total death toll due to the Arab Spring
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by the end of 2011 was around 2,200.** Another example is the case of Yemen, where
the death toll by the end of 2011 according to Amnesty International is 200 whereas
that number according to Yemen’s minister of human

rights 2,000.°’ Therefore, it was

difficult to decide which sources were less biased and more accurate.
As of the first quarter of 2012, Arab-Spring related demonstrations are still
ongoing in states like Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. Also, government-directed violence
in response to these Arab-Spring protests has not been subdued in some MENA states
like Syria and Yemen. Therefore, for my analysis I will only count the “number of
deaths” of each of the six MENA states until December 31, 2011. The figures I have
obtained will be presented in the next chapter.
“Military expenditure” is one of the independent variables that I use to assess
the levels of government-directed violence. According to the CIA Factbook, from
which J obtain the data, military expenditure is defined as “spending on defense
programs as a percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).’° For Bahrain, Tunisia

and Yemen the most recent data on military expenditure come from 2006 and for
Egypt, Libya and Syria only 2005 estimates are available. To be able to compare
different levels of military expenditure of each state in the next chapter, I will use this
data to calculate per-capita values of military expenditure. Data for the other
independent variable, “military personnel” is also obtained from the NationMaster,
and is presented in Chapter Four. Data on “military personnel” is presented as military
personnel for every 1,000 people of each state.

38 “Assad says only ‘crazy” leaders kill own people, questions U.N.’s death toll” Al Arabia News,
December 7, 2011, (http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/07/181242.html) (Accessed March 1,
2012)
* “yemeni Official Puts Uprising’s Toll at ‘Over 2,000 Martyrs’.” Laura Kasinof, The New York
Times. March 19, 2012. (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/yemeni-official-putskillings-at-more-than-2000.html) (Accessed March 21, 2012).

“© Military Expenditure. Source: CIA FactBook
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It is important to present some of the alternatives that could be used to assess
the level of government-directed violence; and also the reasons | have not used them
in my research, because one might argue that the “number of deaths” or “military
expenditure” alone cannot capture the level of government-directed violence in the
Arab Spring. In order to answer this question, it is important to identify what
government-directed violence exactly is. As government-directed violence is closely
associated with state repression, let’s first take a look at what state repression is.
According to Goldstein, “state repression involves the actual or threatened use of
physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as
deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government
personnel, practices or institutions.”*' Having observed the different ways the
governments in MENA have responded so far to the Arab Spring uprisings, we can
say that that this definition of “state repression” is it is a fair description of the
government-directed violence with regard to the current situation in the MENA
region. If we look at the different types of government-directed violence with regard
to “state repression,” they include harassment, surveillance/spying, bans, arrests,

torture, and mass killing by government agents and/or affiliates within their territorial
jurisdiction.‘ With these forms of state-repression and with regard to governmentdirected violence during the Arab-Spring uprisings, we can obtain quantitative
measures for arrests, torture and mass killing by government until the end of year

“' Goldstein RJ. 1978. Political Repression in Modern America: from 1870 to the Present. Cambridge,
MA: Schenkman p.xxvii
* Davenport, Christian. “State Repression and Political Order”, 2007. Annual Review of Political
Science. 10: p.1
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2011. The reason I opted for data on only mass killing by government agents or its
affiliates to measure different levels of government-directed violence is the
unavailability of data on the number of arrests or the number of wounded in some of
the MENA states. While this data was available for some states, it was either

unavailable or unreliable in some states. Therefore, this thesis will use only the
“number of deaths” as a measure of government-directed violence.
As it is a well-known fact that rents obtained from oil wealth do not normally
go into the hands of the ordinary citizens in the MENA region, it makes it possible for
government leaders to allocate these oil rents to oppress and intimidate their own
people by investing the rents on the military and buying off the loyalty of military
personnel. As wealth made from oil exports constitutes a major part of the GDP of
almost all of these MENA states, using data on oil wealth in order to evaluate how
leaders might fund government-directed violence will certainly provide us with an
approximate representation of the strength of the relationship between oil wealth and
government-directed violence.

Measuring Oil Wealth
Although I use independent variables such as “military expenditure” and
“military personnel” to explain different levels of government-directed violence in the
Arab Spring uprisings, it is very important to note that the mechanisms of the said
independent variables are explained through the resource curse. As I take into account
these certain mechanisms of the resource-curse hypothesis, I will take “‘oil” as the

“resource,” to explain different levels of government-directed violence during the
Arab Spring. In order to assess the oil wealth of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia
and Yemen, I will collect data on oil exports and oil production in a given year. I have
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used two variables—oil exports and oil production—to assess the levels of oil wealth,
because I think that both variables will lead to a more accurate estimate of the
strength of the relationship between government-directed violence and oil wealth.
For my analysis I use per-capita values of oil production so that I could
examine the oil wealth of each state in comparison to other five states. Also,
comparing per-capita values give us a better sense of how much a certain government
is capable of funding armed forces, which ultimately determines how much a
government is capable of directing violence against a citizen. I obtained data for oil

production from NationMaster.
The data on oil exports were measured in barrels per day (bbl/day) and were
obtained from the CIA Factbook. Data for oil production is data from 2007, and data
for oil exports is from 2009. Using data from just one year for my analysis can be
justified, because my research focuses on the variation across states and not over
time. Also, these data for each state do not change drastically. Therefore, as long as
the data is taken from a year closer and prior to the Arab-Spring uprisings, the

analysis will not be flawed by using data from a single year.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

4.1. The Arab Spring in a Nutshell
It was the personal tragedy of a Tunisian fruit vendor that sparked the major
political and revolutionary upheavals in the MENA region that is known as the Arab
Spring. Although Mohammed Bouazizi the fruit vendor did not live to witness the
outcome of his desperate act, the so called Arab Spring was sparked by his selfimmolation that brought together masses to protest against their authoritarian
leaderships across the MENA.
Witnessing how Tunisians were able to overthrow the government of Ben Ali,
who was in power for almost 24 years, demonstrators across other MENA states such
as Algeria, Jordan, Syria and Egypt also took to the streets to protest the injustices of
their government authorities. On January 21, 2011 alone, 5000 Jordanians took to the
streets in Amman demonstrating against the government’s imposition of high level of
taxation and increasing fuel prices. These protests later resulted in the dissolution of
the government by King Abdullah, the Jordanian King. Egypt saw an even bigger
protest on January 25, 2011, also known as the “day of rage,” when tens of thousands
of Egyptians took to the streets in Cairo and other cities like Alexandria, Mansura,
Tanta, Aswan and Assiut.”? The demonstrators in Cairo’s main Tahrir Square were

“Timeline: Egypt’s revolution-A chronicle of the revolution that ended the three-decade-long
presidency of Hosni Mubarak.” Al Jazeera. February 14, 2011
(http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html) (Accessed: February
4, 2012)
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crying out “Down with Mubarak,” and they were met with attacks by the police.
Ironically, this “day of rage” happened on a national holiday to commemorate the
very police forces that fired tear gas and used water cannons against the
demonstrators. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak made a few concessions during the
next few days, which the Egyptians were not satisfied with, and on February 1, 2011
Mubarak announced that he would not seek reelection in the upcoming presidential
elections. After the situation in Egypt got more and more tumultuous with clashes
between demonstrators and pro-Mubarak factions, Mubarak stepped down as
president of Egypt and handed power to the military on February 11. Mubarak had
ruled Egypt for almost 30 years.
Although the events that unfolded in Egypt resembled those in Tunisia, many
other states experienced somewhat different situations compared to the first two ArabSpring states. Governments of these states responded to the civil disorder in their

states rather violently, using excessive force against their citizens. In Bahrain, protests
that were largely peaceful and inspired by the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia met
with police violence. At the beginning, Bahrainis only demanded “political reforms,
tight of political participation, respect for human rights, stopping of systematic
discrimination against Shias,” “* but following incidents like the police attacking
protesters at the Pearl Roundabout in Manama on February 17, 2011 and the Bahraini
government forces opening fire on mourners at a funeral procession, the protesters
started demanding the overthrow of both the Bahraini government and the

“4 «Bahrain activists in ‘Day of Rage’. Al Jazeera. February 14, 2011.
(http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/2011214925802473.html) (Accessed: February 5,
2012)
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monarchy."? It is important to note that the majority of the Bahraini population is
Shiite while the ruling monarchy is Sunni.“°
Of all the Arab-Spring participating states, Libya saw the most bloodshed and
government brutality. There have been reports of the Libyan government under the
leadership of Muammar Gaddafi using helicopter gunships, artillery and anti-aircraft
missiles against Libyan demonstrators.’’ Gaddafi had allegedly hired prisoners as
mercenaries to attack the protesters. The situation in Libya turned into a civil war
between rebel forces and Gaddafi’s regime that resulted in many casualties among
both pro-Gaddafi and rebel forces. The Arab Spring in Libya had reached its final
stage as NATO-backed rebel forces raided Gaddafi’s complex on October 20, 2011
killing him, toppling his 42 year old rule. On October 23, 2011, the Transitional

National Council (TNC) that was formed as the de-facto opposition of the Libyan
government earlier in February declared the liberation of Libya.
Started on March 15, 2011, the mass protests in Syria are still ongoing. The
protests demanding the resignation of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad have
turned into a full-scale uprising that has resulted in a large number of casualties of
both civilians and Syrian security forces. The Syrian government claims that over

2000 of the Syrian security forces and 700 civilians have been killed.** However,
according to reports by the United Nations, more than 3,500 protesters including 180

“5 “Bahrain mourners call for end to monarchy” The Guardian. February 18, 2011.
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/feb/18/bahrain-mourners-call-downnfall-monarchy)
(Accessed: February 5, 2012)

“° Background Arab Spring. Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCPD)
(http://www.per.uu.se/digitalAssets/87/87709_

Background

narrative

arabian

spring.pdf)

“7 Timeline Arab Spring, UCDP
(http://www. per.uu.se/digital Assets/87/87711_chronologic_timeline_arabian_spring.pdf)
‘8A rab League delegates head to Syria over ‘bloodbath’” USA Today. December 22, 2011
(http:/Awww.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-12-22/syria-arab-league/52159302/1) (Accessed:

February 7, 2012)
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children have been killed by the Syrian government forces.”’ Similar to the situation
in Libya, Syrian forces have also used (and are still using) tanks and heavy weaponry
to attack unarmed protesters. These acts of violence have been condemned by the
Secretary General of the United Nations, the Arab League, the European Union and
many states around the world.
In Yemen, thousands of protestors gathered in the streets of Sanaa, the Yemeni
capital demanding the resignation of President Ali Abduhlla Saleh. The Yemeni
uprisings erupted in parallel with the uprisings of Egypt, thousands of protestors in
Yemen. Due to the pressure from protestors, Saleh made an announcement on

February 2, 2011 that he would not seek re-election in the next presidential elections
in 2013. As the number of protests and protestors only increased over time,
government forces had started using force against civilians. On March 18, 2011 40

people were killed by Yemeni security forces as they opened fire on a demonstration
in Sanaa. This incident resulted in President Saleh declaring the Yemen to be under
emergency rule. After much violence between the Saleh government and the Yemeni
opposition over the next few months, on November 23, 2011 President Saleh finally

resigned by signing a document that transferred his power to the vice president,
ending his 33 year rule. So far, the Yemeni uprisings have cost over 1,800 Yemeni
lives.

In addition to the events mentioned in the states above, there have been protests in
states like Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco and Oman that were inspired by the
popular revolts elsewhere in the MENA. Also, there were minor protests in Lebanon,
Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Western Sahara, but they were subdued without

*° «Syria death toll tops 3,500, UN says.” BBC News,(November 8, 2011
(http:/Avww.bbe.co.uk/news/world-middle-cast-15635867)
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(Accessed: February 7, 2012)

much violent outcomes. Clashes between Israelis and Palestinians on May 15, 2011

on the Israel border were also reported to have been inspired by other Arab Spring
uprisings.

As of January 31, 2012, protests of the so called Arab Spring are still ongoing in
Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, along with minor protests in some countries like
Jordan, Mauritania, Kuwait and Morocco. Despite major outcomes like the ousting of

Mubarak in Egypt and the resignation of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh that
ended his 33-year rule, Egyptians and Yemenis still protest as most of their demands
have not yet been met.
The next section of this chapter presents information on the different levels of

government-directed violence and oil wealth of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia
and Yemen. This section will be followed by an analysis of the data and a discussion
on the findings as well as possible explanations for the findings.

4.2. Government-directed Violence and Oil Wealth

Table 4.1: Arab-Spring Death Toll until December, 2011.

RANK

| STATE

DEATH TOLL

6

BAHRAIN

47

4

EGYPT

926

1
2

LIBYA
SYRIA

5

TUNISIA

30,000
5,000
308

3

YEMEN

2000
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Table 4.3: Oil Exports

Table 4.2: Oil Production

RANK

OIL
PRODUCTION
(bbl/day per

[6

| EGYPT
SYRIA

5
4

TUNISIA
YEMEN

[8.265
22.428
8.389
12.822

|STATE

| OIL
EXPORTS
(bbI/day)

3
pS

BAHRAIN | 239,900
163,000
| EGYPT

6
4

63.00
TUNISIA — | 91,200
YEMEN
207,700

Table 4.4: Military expenditure
RANK | STATE

MILITARY
PERSONNEL”

POPULATION”

MILITARY
PERSONNEL PER
1,000 PEOPLE

‘| 799000

83,688,164

of,

76000

6,733,620

11.3

F2470000

10,732,900

= 213 8000seaa ace: 24,771,809 | 5 6

Military personnel per 1,000 people
MILITARY
EXPENDITURE (%
OF GDP

Se EGYPT

[8

SSS

SL OY
14%.
6.6%

Data

GDP PER
CAPITA

$5100
| $9,500
$2,500

MILITARY
EXPENDITURE
PER CAPITA

)SUIOO
| $30,090
$13,300
$ 16,500

from 2005. Source: NationMaster (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_per-military-

personnel)

°'2012 estimates of population. Source: CIA FactBook (https:/Awvww.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/rankorder/2119rank.htm!?countryName=Bahrain&countryCode=ba&regionCode=mde&rank
=157#ba
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4,3. Analysis of Tables 4.1-4.5
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Figure 4.1: Arab-Spring Death Toll until December, 201 1

Both Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 above show the number of deaths that each of
the six states experienced as a result of the Arab-Spring uprisings until December,
2011. These death tolls range from 47 to 30,000, the lowest being in Bahrain and the

highest being in Libya. When looking at Figure 4.1, we can see that there have been
considerably large numbers of casualties in Libya and Syria compared to the other
four states. Although Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia all had death tolls below 1,000,
Bahrain’s 47 deaths is relatively very low compared to the other three states. Yemen
lies between Egypt and Syria with a death toll of 2,000. Since “number of deaths” is
one of the measures of government-directed violence in this research, we can say that
Libya, Syria and Yemen respectively had higher levels of government-directed
violence, while Bahrain, Tunisia and Egypt had the relatively lower levels of
government-directed violence in that order.
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Figure 4.2: Oil Production

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively provide information on the different levels in
oil production and oil exports of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Of
the six states, Libya and Bahrain produce more barrels of oil per day per 1,000 people

compared to other four states. Libya produces an amount of 305.62 barrels per day per
1,000 people. Bahrain ranks second with its 68.603 barrels per day per 1,000 people,
which is almost five times less than the amount that Libya produces. While Syria
produces 22.428 barrels per day for every 1,000 people, the other three states, Egypt,
Tunisia and Yemen do not produce as much oil as the other three states do. The oil
production is low in these three states, because in comparison to other oil-rich states,
Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen have relatively smaller oil reserves. For this reason, Egypt
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and Tunisia are known as states with little or no oil.°? Of these three states, Egypt
produces the least amount of oil with 8.265 barrels per day per 1,000 people, followed
by Tunisia and Yemen respectively.
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Figure 4.3: Oil Exports

Also in oil exports, Libya ranks first among the sample of six states. As
shown in Table 4.3, Libya exports 1,580,000 barrels per day. Although Bahrain
produced more oil per 1,000 people according to Table 4.2, Syria exports more oil
than Bahrain. In both oil production and oil exports, however, Libya leads by a very
large margin. When assessing the oil wealth of each state, we see in Table 4.3 above

and Figure 4.3 below that Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen are still in the bottom three of
all six states when it comes to measuring oil wealth. This is due to the fact that these

three states produce less oil compared to Bahrain, Libya and Syria, and thereby they
have less oil to export. Tunisia exports the least amount of oil with 91,200 barrels per
day. Egypt exports 163,000 barrels per day and Yemen exports 207,700 barrels per

* Ross, Michael L. “Will oil drown the Arab spring?: Democracy and the Resource Curse”
September/October 2011 p.4
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day. Since the amount of oil exports are translated into wealth, we can say that Libya,
Syria and Bahrain obtain the biggest amounts of revenues from oil wealth of their
states.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present information on “military expenditure” and
“military personnel” of the six MENA states. As I have explained in the Research
Design earlier, I use “military expenditure” of each state to analyze the levels of
violence, because how much a government spends on its military not only shows the
capacity of a government to use on its people, but also gives us a sense of a possible
mechanism of oil wealth being transferred into a tool of repression. While I have
explained earlier that Ross (2001) finds no evidence to support the claim that oil
wealth leads to higher levels of military personnel, comparing the different levels of
military personnel across Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen helps us
understand the extent to which governments are capable of using the military as a tool
of repression.
The most recent data available for military expenditure as a percentage of the
GDP came from the year 2006. The GDP per capita values that I use to calculate
military expenditure per capita for Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen are
from year 2011, while the figure for Libya is the 2010 estimate of GDP per capita. As
the GDP of these states vary, analyzing the military expenditure as a percentage of the
GDP does not paint the best picture of how much each state spends on the military in
comparison to other states. For example, Table 4.2 shows that Bahrain spends 4.5%
of its GDP on the military, and both Syria and Yemen spends higher percentages of
the GDP on the military. But when we translate these percentages into per capita
values of military expenditure, we have a different picture: Bahrain has the highest
military expenditure per capita of the six states and Yemen, whose percentage of GDP
4]

on military expenditure is the highest, has the second lowest military expenditure per
capita value. For this reason, I have calculated the military expenditure per capita
values for each state.
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Figure 4.4: Military Expenditure per Capita

When we look closely at Figure 4.4 above, we can see that despite the

relatively low number of deaths in Bahrain shown in Table 4.1, Bahrain spends the
most on its military per person in comparison to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and
Yemen. Libya ranks second with military expenditure worth $54,990 per capita. Syria
is also spends over $30,000 per capita on military expenditure. Egypt, Tunisia and
Yemen are the bottom three states in military expenditure, with Tunisia spending the

lowest amount of money on its military with an amount of $13,300. Yemen’s military
expenditure per capita of $16,500 is slightly above that of Tunisia, and below Egypt’s
$22,100. When looking at military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Yemen
spends 6.6% of its GDP on its military. However, it has a relatively low GDP per
capita compared to other states. Tunisia spends on its military only 1.4% of its GDP,
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and because of this reason, it has the lowest military expenditure per capita value of
all six states.
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Figure 4.5: Military Personnel

When examining the number of military personnel in each state, we see that
Syria and Bahrain have the highest numbers of military personnel per 1,000 people.
For every 1,000 Syrians, there are 18.5 military personnel, and for Bahrain, there are
16.8 military personnel. Libya still belongs to the top three states, ranking as the third
highest state in the number of military personnel with 11.3 per 1,000 people. With
only 4.38 military personnel for every 1,000 Tunisians, Tunisia has the lowest number
of military personnel of the sample of six states. Egypt and Yemen also have fewer
than 10 military personnel for every 1,000 people with 9.5 and 5.6 military personnel
respectively. By examining Figures 4.4 and 4.5 and considering the assumption that
oil wealth could be invested in tools of repression that governments can use against its
people, we can say that Bahrain, Libya and Syria invest the most in governmentdirected violence of all six states. In contrast, Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen appear to
invest less in tools of repression needed for government-directed violence.
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4.4, Findings
In my analysis, the level of government-directed violence was represented by the
number of deaths due to the Arab Spring. While military expenditure per capita and
the number of military personnel did not necessarily represent the level of
government-directed violence directly, these two variables represent a possible
mechanism of oil wealth being translated into tools of repression. The level of oil
wealth was represented by oil production and oil exports. Using these variables, I
expected to find a positive correlation between government-directed violence and oil
wealth. For example, if my hypothesis holds, if “state X” had the most number of
deaths or spends the most on its military, I expect “state X” to export the most amount
of oil. Or, if “state Y” had the least number of deaths, I expected “state Y” to have

little or no oil. Also, I expected a consistent pattern among the variables. For example,
I expected the states that had higher death tolls to spend more on its military and have
more military personnel; or states that produce more oil to export more oil. However,
my hypothesis did not hold because of one state: Bahrain. Although Bahrain had the

lowest level of government-directed violence with a death toll of 47, it also has the
highest level of military expenditure per capita as well as the second highest level of
military personnel per 1,000 people. Therefore, when it came to Bahrain, there was an
inconsistency in the different independent variables I had used to measure

government-directed violence. When analyzing the relationship between oil and
government-directed violence, Bahrain did not hold to my hypothesis because despite

Bahrain’s relatively very low death toll during the Arab-Spring uprisings, of the six
states, it was still one of top states that both produced and exported oil. Bahrain

ranked second in oil production with 68.603 barrels per day per 1,000 people, and
ranked third in oil exports with 239,900 barrels per day slightly falling behind Syria
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which exported 236,000 barrels per day. Therefore, Bahrain appears to give the notion
“more oil, less violence,” which is contrary to my hypothesis.
Although Bahrain’s behavior made it difficult to find a pattern when analyzing the
relationship between different levels of government-directed violence and oil wealth,
it was still quite noticeable that Libya had the highest death tolls of all six states and
also the highest oil production and oil exports per capita. Therefore, there was still a
possibility for the hypothesis to hold under certain circumstances. When looking at
Syria, it was observed that Syria always belonged in the top three states in terms of
both government-directed violence and oil wealth; thus Syria has had both high levels
of government-directed violence as well as high levels of oil. Compared to other
states, Egypt and Tunisia have both had relatively lower levels of governmentdirected violence due to Arab-Spring uprisings, as well as lower levels of oil wealth.
Yemen, whose level of government-directed violence lies between the levels of Egypt
and Syria, also takes the same position between Egypt and Syria in terms of oil
wealth. Therefore, while Bahrain appeared to be out of place in the sample of six

states, the other five states painted a picture that supported the resource-curse
hypothesis.
Since my hypothesis does not hold for Bahrain, I decided to investigate whether
there were any other striking differences in Bahrain compared to the other five states,
and found that Bahrain is different from Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen in

certain aspects like the size of the state, oil reserves, the economy and the government
type. Compared to the size of other five states, Bahrain is a very small state with an
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area of only 760 square kilometers, only 3.5 times bigger than Washington p.c.?

Bahrain is the first Gulf state to discover oil and its reserves are expected to run out in
Por thisthi reason, Bahrain has tried
, to diversify
;
;its economy
the next 10 to 15 years.” 4 For
accordingly, and has succeeded in doing so by becoming the most diversified

economy in the Persian Gulf. Due to highly developed transportation and
communication facilities, Bahrain is home to many multinational corporations and
businesses. Although revenues from petroleum industry account for approximately

25% of Bahrain’s GDP oil wealth still bring about 76% of government income.”
When government types of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen

were compared, Bahrain stood out as the only constitutional monarchy.°° Since
Bahrain did not support the “more oil, more violence” argument, I decided to
investigate the oil production and Arab-Spring casualties of other monarchies in the

MENA. Table 4.6 presents information on oil production and the death toll related to
the Arab Spring of each monarchy. Note that Libya is not a monarchy and it is
included in the table for the purpose of showing how much oil Middle-East
monarchies produce compared to the six states of my research.

°3 However, with its population of 1,248,348, Bahrain is one of the most densely populated states in the
world. It also has a large foreign labor force which constitutes 20% of the population. (Source: CIA
Factbook)

*4 Source: U.S. Department of State: Background Notes on Bahrain (Accessed: March 25, 2012)
°> Source: U.S. Department of State: Background Notes on Bahrain (Accessed: March 25, 2012)

*6Syria, Tunisia and Yemen were all unitary presidential republics and Libya was a “Jamahiriya”, a
‘state of the masses’, at the onset of the Arab-Spring uprisings in the MENA.
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STATE

TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

| OIL

RANK IN OIL | ARAB-

PRODUCTION | PRODUCTION | SPRING
(bbl/day per
PER 1,000
DEATH

Qatar

1,000 people)”
1,240.04

Absolute monarchy

Kuwait

Hereditary constitutional

United Arab
Emirates
Saudi Arabia
Libya
Oman
Bahrain

monarchy
Constitutional federation | 663.365
of absolute monarchies
Absolute monarchy
371.363
305.62
Absolute monarchy
222.878
Constitutional monarchy | 68.603

| 1,042.88

| CAPITA
1

TOLL
0

2

0

4

0

7
8
9
21

10
6
47

Table 4.6: Monarchies in the Middle East

Table 4.6 clearly shows that monarchies in the Middle East produce the most oil
per 1,000 people in the world and also have very low death tolls, if there are any at
all, due to the Arab Spring uprisings in the MENA. In fact, the Arab Spring did not
even reach states like Qatar and United Arab Emirates.** When comparing ArabSpring death tolls of Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, Bahrain that
had the lowest number of casualties. However, according to the table above,

Bahrain’s 47 deaths is the highest number of deaths we see among the monarchies in
the Middle East. It is interesting to observe that in this group of oil-rich monarchies,
the states that produce relatively high levels of oil per capita showed little to no
government-directed violence in response to the Arab Spring while states like Bahrain

°7 Data from 2007. Source: NationMaster (accessed: March 2, 2012)
°8 Qatar is a leading supporter of the supports the Arab-Spring protest movements in the rest of the
MENA, and it is in support of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian opposition. Qatar strives to
maintain good relations with both Iran and the United States as both states are important to Qatar’s
survival. As Iran supports al-Assad’s government in Syria, Qatar fears that the situation in Syria might
risk destabilizing its traditional balancing act between the United States and Iran. (Source: Steinburg,
Guido. “Qatar and the Arab Spring” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comments February, 2012.

German Institute for International And Security Affairs http://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C07_sbg.pdf)
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that produce relatively lower levels of oil per capita saw a noteworthy presence of
government-directed violence. Although this observation
alone is contrary to the

resource-curse hypothesis, it is important to remember that most of the monarchies
above are known for high levels of authoritarianism and repression.”
Focusing back on the original research question, and taking into consideration the
differences in Bahrain, especially the fact that Bahrain as a constitutional monarchy
has a regime type that is very different to the other five states, I decided to analyze the
same sample of states in which Bahrain is excluded. The following tables and figures

present information on government-directed violence and oil wealth of only Egypt,
Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.

4.5. Government-directed Violence and Oil Wealth (without Bahrain)

Table 4.7: Arab-Spring death toll until December, 2011.
RANK
4

| STATE
EGYPT

DEATH TOLL
926

* According to Freedom House, Kuwait is ‘partly free’ and all of the other Middle East monarchies are
‘not free’ indicating that they have repressive political institutions.
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Table 4.9: Oil Exports

Table 4.8: Oil Production
RANK | STATE

OIL
PRODUCTION

RANK | STATE

OIL
EXPORTS

(bbl/day per
1,000 people)

(bbI/day)

8.265

4

8.389

DL

12.822

3C

EGYPT

_| 163,000

Table 4.10: Military expenditure
RANK | STATE

3

EGYPT

MILITARY
GDP PER
EXPENDITURE (% | CAPITA
OF GDP)
3.4%
$6,500

MILITARY
EXPENDITURE
PER CAPITA
$22,100
4.990

1

a

SYRIA

9%

555100

8 30,090

5

TUNISIA

1.4%

$9,500

$13,300

a

YEMEN

6.6%

$2,500

$ 16,500

Table 4.11: Military personnel per 1,000 people

RANK | STATE

Military personnel” | Population”!

Military personnel

(2005 data)

(July 2012)

per 1,000 people

799000

83,688,164

9.5

10,732,900

4.38

24,771,809

5.6

3

EGYPT

5

TUNISIA — | 47000

4

YEMEN

138000

® Source: NationMaster
§! Source: CIA FactBook
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4.6. Analysis of Tables 4.7-4.11
After removing Bahrain from the previous sample of Arab-Spring
participating states, now we have a new sample of five states for the new analysis:
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. According to Table 4.7, Libya and Syria
respectively have the highest number of deaths. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 which represent
the level of oil wealth of the states also indicate that Libya and Syria produce and
export the most amount of oil of the five states. In military expenditure per capita,
Libya leads once more with $54,900 military expenditure per capita with Syria in the
second place with spending $30,000 per person on military expenditure. Table 4.11
however shows that Syria has more military personnel per 1,000 people and that
Libya ranks second behind Syria. Regardless, Libya and Syria both dominate the first
two positions in the number of deaths, oil production, oil exports, military expenditure
and military personnel. As Libya and Syria show he highest levels of governmentdirected violence as well as the highest levels of oil wealth of the five states, Egypt,
Tunisia and Yemen observably show relatively low levels of government-directed
violence as well as relatively low levels of oil wealth compared to Libya and Syria.

35000
30000
25000
20000

= Number of deaths

15000
10000

5000

ES

0 +,

Egypt

;

Libya

;

Syria

T

Tunisia

Figure 4.6: Arab -Spring Death Toll until December, 2011
50

Ea

Yemen

350
300
250
200
® Oil Production (bbl/day per
1,000 people)

150

100 |}

—_$_$_$_$_____

50

0 _ =

T

Egypt

T

Libya

a

T

Syria

Ean

ia

T

Tunisia

Yemen

Figure 4.7: Oil production

1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000

® Oil Exports (bbl/da
il Exports (obI/day)

800,000 |
600,000
400,000
200,000
0

4

Egypt

Libya

Syria

Tunisia

Figure 4.8: Oil Exports (without Bahrain)

51

Yemen

$60,000 -#——___
$50,000
$40,000
$30,000

po

™ Military expenditure per capita

$20,000

$10,000

$0
Egypt

Libya

Syria

Tunisia

Yemen

Figure 4.9: Military Expenditure (without Bahrain)

20
18
16

® Military personnel per 1,000
people

Egypt

Libya

Syria

Tunisia

Figure 4.10: Military Personnel (without Bahrain)

52

Yemen

Tables 4.7-4.11 and Figures 4.6-4.10 clearly show that Libya and Syria not
only have the highest levels of government-directed violence, but also have the
highest levels of oil wealth of the five states. When analyzing the “ranks” in Tables
4.6-4.10 the states that rank high in oil wealth, Libya and Syria, also happen to be the
states that rank high in government-directed violence during the Arab-Spring
uprisings. Egypt and Tunisia are in the bottom two states in terms of both the levels of
government-directed violence and the levels of oil wealth. Of these three states with
little or no oil, Tunisia and Egypt appear to be the states that produce and export the
least amount of oil. In Yemen, it has the third highest level of government-directed
violence, as well as the third highest level of per capita oil production and oil exports.
When looking at per capita values of military expenditure and military
personnel of each state in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 which were used to explain the
possible mechanisms of oil wealth translating into government-directed violence,
Egypt appears to have higher levels of military expenditure per capita as well as
military personnel per capita than Yemen. However, if we compare military
expenditure of the two states only as a percentage of their GDPs, Egypt spends only
3.4% of its GDP on its military, which is less than the 6.6% of the GDPA that Yemen
spends on its military.
As we can see from the data provided in the tables and figures above, states
like Libya and Syria that had higher levels of government-directed violence during the
Arab-Spring uprisings are also the states with higher levels of oil wealth. States like
Egypt and Tunisia with relatively lower levels of government-directed violence also
happened to be states with lower levels of oil wealth. Once Bahrain is excluded from
the previous sample of states, my hypothesis holds true. Thus, I have found a positive
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correlation between the level of oil wealth and the level of government-directed
violence in response to Arab-Spring uprisings under certain conditions (i.e. states that
are not constitutional monarchies), and thereby I have also been able to provide
support for the resource-curse hypothesis.
This chapter ends with the following discussion in which I have incorporated
the above findings into the various incidents and outcomes of the Arab-Spring in the
MENA that I was not able to quantify in my research.

4.8. Discussion

In this thesis, I attempted to apply the resource-curse hypothesis to answer the
question, “Did states with more oil wealth tend to use more government-directed
violence in response to Arab-Spring uprisings?” I examined both the extent to which
the government leaders of MENA states used violence against their people in
response to the uprisings and the level of oil wealth each government depended on
prior to the onset of the Arab Spring. The sample of six states I chose for my research
includes Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. By examining the
different levels of government-directed violence and oil wealth of the six MENA
states, I intended to find out whether there was a positive correlation between oil
wealth and government-directed violence. Initially, my hypothesis did not hold,
because Bahrain’s relatively low level of government-directed violence, which was
represented by the number of deaths during the Arab-Spring uprisings, could not be
explained by its high levels of oil wealth as well as its high levels of military

expenditure. When compared with other monarchies in the MENA such as Qatar,
Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, I found that the negative

correlation between oil wealth and government-directed violence that Bahrain
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exhibited was present in the said monarchies as well. These were all monarchies that

produce and export a substantial amount of oil, but there weren’t as many casualties
in these states that resulted from the Arab-Spring uprisings.
However, the hypothesis did hold when Bahrain was excluded from the
sample of states. The new sample comprised of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and
Yemen and the states that were more oil wealthy exhibited more government-directed
violence. Therefore, I come to the conclusion that the resource-curse hypothesis does
hold under certain conditions.
In my research I was not only able to show that that under certain conditions
there is a positive correlation between the level of government-directed violence and
the level of oil wealth, but I was also able to find support for a possible mechanism of
oil wealth translating into government-directed violence that Ross (2001) talks about:
government leaders lavishly funding their military to buy the loyalty of their armed
forces. By examining how much governments in the MENA spend on their military
and how much military personnel there are in each state, I found that there were more
military expenditure and more military personnel in the states where there was more
oil wealth. Ultimately, in the same states that had high levels of oil wealth and high
levels of expenditure on the military and military personnel, (i.e. Libya and Syria) we

saw that the level of government-directed violence in response to the Arab Spring was
much higher in comparison to other states like Egypt and Tunisia. Similarly, states
that had little or no oil (i.e. Egypt and Tunisia) spent less on their militaries and had
relatively lower numbers of military personnel and in the end had relatively lower
levels of government-directed violence during the Arab Spring.
Although data on per capita military expenditure or military personnel per
1,000 people of each provide sufficient support in explaining the positive correlation
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between levels of government-directed violence and oil wealth, the final outcomes of

the Arab Spring in each of the states also provide substantial support for the
mechanism of oil wealth being translated into funding the militaries. The first
examples are Tunisia and Egypt. Both Tunisia and Egypt spend relatively less on their
militaries, possibly because the two states are not as oil rich as states like Libya or
Syria are. As Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak had not funded the
military enough to buy the complete loyalty of the armed forces, the result was the
armed forces in both Tunisia and Egypt who were once loyal to their leaders changing
the allegiance from the government to the people. In Tunisia, the military did attack
the protesting Tunisians at first who were demanding Ben Ali’s ouster. But as the
civilian protests gained momentum quicker than ever, allegedly at the command of
General Rashid Ammar of the Tunisian military, the armed forces had refused to obey
the orders of President Ben Ali by informing their leader of 25 years that the military
would no longer shoot the Tunisian protesters.” Likewise, Ben Ali’s orders to dismiss
General Rashid Ammar were also dismissed. This change of allegiance by the
Tunisian military was the last straw on the camel’s back for the collapse of Ben Ali’s
long-standing regime, as Ben Ali stepped down as president on as early as January 14,
2011, less than two months after Bouzizi’s self-immolation. If Tunisia were wealthier

in terms of oil resources, Ben Ali might have been able to fund the Tunisian military
more lavishly and thus he would have been able to have full control over the Tunisian
military.

* Cook, Steven A. January 20, 2011. “The Calculations of Tunisian Military” Council on Foreign
Relations
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The case in Egypt is also similar, but as Egypt obtained more revenues from
oil exports than Tunisia, it took longer for Mubarak to lose the allegiance of the
Egyptian military than Ben Ali in Tunisia. The Egyptian military was the source of
Mubarak’s authority, but just like the Tunisian armed forces, the Egyptian armed
forces had informed Mubarak in early January in 201 that they would no longer stand
in the way of protesters calling for the ouster of the dictator who has ruled Egypt for
thirty years. In a statement released to the public the army said, “The presence of the
army in the streets is for your sake and to ensure your safety and well-being. The
armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people.” The statement
further said, “Your armed forces, who are aware of the legitimacy of your demands
are keen to assume their responsibility in protecting the nation and the citizen, affirms
that freedom of expression through peaceful means is guaranteed to everybody.”™
This was a huge blow to Mubarak and on February 11, 2011, he had to hand power to
the military upon his resignation. Mubarak was later put on trial for several charges
including premeditated murder as he had ordered the Egyptian military to fire live
ammunition at unarmed demonstrators. °° When comparing to the situation in Tunisia
in terms of oil wealth and thus the ability to fund repressive apparatuses such as the
military, we can say that as Egypt was slightly wealthier in oil resources Mubarak was
able to have enough control of the military at first, but since Egypt did not have as
much oil wealth as Libya or Syria he failed to prevent his military from standing aside

® UPDATE !-Egypt army: will not use violence against citizens. January 31, 2011. Reuters.
http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAF LDE70U2JC20110131
* Ibid.
§° Timeline Arab Spring, Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP)
(http://www. per.uu.se/digital Assets/87/877 1 1_chronologic_timeline_arabian_spring.pdf)
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without protecting civilians as they did later on. It is possible that the Egyptian
military changed its loyalty to Mubarak and took the side of the Egyptian people
when it became clear that he was going to lose.
Having investigated Tunisia and Egypt, it is important to note that regardless
of the little variation in the level of oil wealth in Tunisia and Egypt, the levels of oil
wealth in the two states still corresponded in accordance with the resource-curse
hypothesis with the level of government-directed violence in response to Arab-Spring
uprisings. In other words, Tunisia, whose oil wealth is less than that of Egypt, saw
government-directed violence less and major political outcomes sooner. Egypt saw
relatively more government-directed violence compared to Tunisia and saw the major
outcome of the collapse of the Mubarak regime after Ben Ali’s fall.
Although the Arab Spring in Libya was somewhat different compared to other
MENA states due to international intervention, the Libyan government under the
leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi extensively used violence against the
protesting Libyans on the streets until Gaddafi’s was killed on October 20, 2011. Of
all MENA states, Gaddafi’s government used the most brutal and violent methods to
fend off protestors. These methods of Gaddafi ranged from hiring prisoners as
mercenaries to shoot unarmed civilians to cutting off internet access to
indiscriminately shelling Libyan towns with grad rockets.® The civil war between
Gaddafi loyalists and the anti-government rebels, who later became the Libyan
National Transitional Council, resulted in 30,000 reported deaths. With the amount of

oil wealth Libya has, which was the highest among the six states that I studied in my

** Timeline Arab Spring, Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP)
(http://www. per.uu.se/digital Assets/87/87711_chronologic_timeline_arabian_spring.pdf)
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research, it is very likely that Gaddafi government used oil wealth on the large
amount of weapons and armored vehicles in his military. Had not the NATO
intervened in the situation to back the rebel forces that ultimately led to Gaddafi’s
death in 2011, government-directed violence in Libya would be still ongoing. I make
this speculation because the situation in Syria, which is also an oil-rich state like
Libya, is still ongoing with the al-Assad government constantly using excessive
violence against the Syrian population.
Arab-Spring uprisings in Syria are still ongoing, and al-Assad’s government is
still standing strong with the help of the Syrian Armed Forces against antigovernment forces. Despite making changes in the constitution, providing tax cuts
and increasing public-sector salaries Syrians are still demanding the resignation of
President Bashar al-Assad. Unlike other leaders like Ben Ali, Mubarak and Saleh, al-

Assad has refused to resign despite massive protests against his leadership. Instead,
al-Assad has ordered the Syrian Armed Forces as well as police forces to use
excessive violence on civilians across Syria. As the Syrian government has more

access to oil wealth compared to other states like Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, it uses
the mechanism of using revenues extracted from oil wealth to lavishly fund the
military—to buy the loyalty of the Syrian Armed Forces who would in turn show their
support by obeying the orders to use violence on people—and thereby stay in power
longer than other leaders who spend relatively less on their militaries.
As of end of March in 2012, Arab-Spring related protests are still ongoing in

Yemen, although the government had been overthrown. After many attempts, Ali
Abdullah Saleh was overthrown as president on February 27, 2012. Yemen saw this

regime change only after witnessing over 2,000 casualties in 2011. It is important to
point out that Yemen is wealthier in oil resources and it saw this major political
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outcome only after less oil-wealthy Egypt experienced a major change of regime with
arelatively lower level of government-directed violence compared to that of Yemen.
While Yemen is poorer compared to other five states I had studied, the fact that 6.6%

of its GDP was spent military expenditure explains the relatively higher level of
government-directed violence during Saleh regime. If we are to explain why Saleh
was not able to cling to power longer as Syria’s al-Assad is at present, it could be due
to the fact that Yemen’s oil production has been declining in the recent years.
Although the oil sector in Yemen represents 30% of the state’s GDP and contributes
75% to the state budget as well as 90 % of export earnings, it has been reported that
the oil production has been declining steadily.”
The case of Bahrain itself is an interesting one, especially after examining oil
wealth and government-directed violence in other monarchies in the MENA. The
“more oil, less violence” behavior of the Middle Eastern monarchies disputed the

resource-curse hypothesis entirely as the Arab Spring did not even reach some of the
extremely oil-rich states like the United Arab Emirates despite the fact that these
states are higly repressive. As there there was little to no popular protests in these
states during the Arab Spring in the other MENA states, it is possible that the
governments did not have to resort to using violence against their citizens. A possible
explanation for the absence of protests against these repressive oil-rich monarchies
could be that their ability to use oil wealth to shield their states from the economic and
political pressures that had sparked protests in states like Egypt and Tunisia. While it
could also be that large government coffers full of oil revenues do indeed meet the

* Juneau, Thomas. “Yemen: Prospects for State Failure-Implications and Remedies” Middle East
Policy Council (http://mepc.org/journal/middle-cast-policy-archives/yemen-prospects-statefailure?print) (Accessed: March 13, 2012)
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needs of the people, but it could also mean that people do not have the freedom or
opportunity to protest their governments due to the repressive political apparatuses.
This may be the case, as reports have shown that the United Arab Emirates for
example, has blocked websites such as UAE Hewar in which bloggers post calls for
more direct democracy.® In addition, UAE has dissolved the elected boards of
prominent nongovernmental organizations such as the Jurists’ Association and the
Teachers’ Association whom the UAE rulers fear would mobilize citizens against
their government. Therefore, there is still a possibility that the resource-curse
hypothesis might still hold true if we look deeper into the political situations of these
states.

°8 Shah, Angela. July 18, 2011. “Why the Arab Spring Never Came to the U.A.E.” Time World
(http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2083768,00.html) (Accessed: March 25, 2012)
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
The revolutionary political upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) which became known as the Arab Spring is a phenomenon that has captured
the attention of both the public and scholars equally. The resource-curse hypothesis is
also a “hot” topic not only among political economists but also among policy analysts
on the MENA region and the mass media. In this thesis, I applied this popular
resource-curse hypothesis to explain the different levels of government-directed
violence during the first year of the Arab-Spring uprisings in the MENA.
There are many potential explanations for the surge of Arab-Spring uprisings
that started in late 2009, and I was able to explain the different levels of governmentdirected violence using the resource-curse hypothesis. I found a positive correlation
between the level of government-directed violence and the level of oil wealth among
states that were not constitutional monarchies like Bahrain. I was not only able to find
a pattern between government-directed violence and oil wealth, but I was also able to
explain the mechanism of oil wealth being translated into funding tools of repression
(i.e. military) using events related to the Arab-Spring uprisings. Since Bahrain and
other constitutional monarchies in the Middle East did not follow the pattern of “more
oil, more violence,” I came to the conclusion that the resource-curse hypothesis
applies only to certain regime types. However, it is important to note that very low
levels or absence of government-directed violence in these Middle-East monarchical
states do not necessarily mean that there is less repression. In my thesis I investigated
the different levels of government-directed violence, which is a form of repression,
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but not as same as repression. As these oil-rich monarchies in the Middle East
have not used physical violence against their people as other MENA states have, it
would be interesting to build on this observation studies on limitations and conditions

to the resource-curse hypothesis.

Problems encountered
One of the biggest challenges I encountered while conducting my research
was obtaining the most accurate data on the casualties of the Arab Spring. The
discrepancy between data from one source and the other was sometimes unusually
large. This problem applied especially to Yemen whose death toll in 2011 was
strikingly different from one source to another. The estimates Yemen’s death toll
provided by Amnesty International by the end of 2011 was 200, but in mid-March of
2012, the Yemeni minister of human rights informed the United Nations that at least

2,000 people have been killed in 2011 as a result of the Arab-Spring uprisings. As
former President Saleh was still in power toward the end of 2011, there was an

absence of independent media in the capital Sana’a and other major towns in Yemen,
it led me to believe that the estimates on Yemen provided by Amnesty International

were somewhat inaccurate. Therefore, I decided to rely on the data provided by the
post-Saleh government of Yemen which the United Nation also considers as the
official death toll. Regardless, it is still very difficult to test the validity of these
numbers even for MENA governments.
Not being able to find additional ways to quantify government-directed
violence during the Arab Spring was another problem I encountered. Although I
wanted to incorporate data on other variables of government-directed violence such as
the number of civilians wounded or the number of protestors attacked, other than
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news reports on separate incidents related to the Arab Spring, a complete set of data
on various types of government-directed violence was unavailable. However, since

my research is not primarily quantitative, but qualitative, I tried my best to
incorporate into my thesis information obtained from news articles and situation
reports on the Arab Spring of each state of the sample of six states, with the hope of
providing the most balanced perspective of each MENA state that I studied carefully.

Contribution to Scholarship
Most scholars have done research on determining the relationship between
authoritarianism and oil wealth using “regime type” to measure authoritarianism. The
“regime type” itself is measured by the “polity score” of each state which determines
where the state lies between the range of “most autocratic” to “most democratic” in
the polity scale of -10 to 10.% However, when conducting research specifically on the
MENA region whose polity scores are similar, it is difficult to analyze the variation
within the MENA states.”° In my thesis, as I have used government-directed violence
as a way to measure authoritarianism in which there was a noticeable variation in the
levels of violence. Therefore, I believe that J have been able to present a different

method to determine the extent to which a state is authoritarian.
As I have been able to provide sufficient evidence and explanations that the
resource-curse hypothesis holds true under certain conditions, this thesis contributes

® In the polity scale, (-10) is the most autocratic and (10) is the most democratic,
” Polity scores according to Polity IV project in 2009 and 2010: Bahrain (-7, -8), Egypt (-3, -3), Libya
(-7,-7), Syria (-7,-7), Tunisia (-4,-4), Yemen (-2,-2). Also, according to the Democracy Index, all six

states are autocratic states.
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>
to the resource-curse literature that supports the resource-curse hypothesis, as well as

literature that explain the conditional nature of the resource-curse hypothesis.
Studies and research on the Arab-Spring uprisings have just begun and as the
events of Arab Spring are still unfolding, we can only speculate how much scholarly
work on the Arab Spring there will be in future. As many MENA experts and other
political scientists are currently in the process of deciphering the Arab Spring in order
to find possible explanations for this new wave of democracy in region that was once
robustly authoritarian, it is very likely that that there will a substantial amount of
Arab-Spring related research done. Thus, I hope that thesis will be one of the early

contributions to the larger body of “Arab-Spring literature” that we are likely to see in
future.
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